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ABSTRACT: This essay argues for two complementary theses, one pertaining to epistemology 
and the other to politics. First, unless philosophy adopts a radical empiricist standpoint and 
seeks the uttermost generalities, it cannot differentiate itself from yet another form of limited 
expertise and becomes useless. Second, both radical empiricism and imaginative pragmatism 
lead the philosopher towards the left end of the political spectrum, i.e., to a radically 
progressive politics.  





This philosophical essay is put under the dual patronage of William James (1842–1910) 
and Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947). Accordingly, instead of speaking about 
facts, things, reality, substance and the like, it uses as often as possible the process 
language of experience and events. It argues for two complementary theses, one 
pertaining to epistemology and the other to politics.  
First, unless philosophy adopts a radical empiricist standpoint and seeks the 
uttermost generalities, it cannot differentiate itself from yet another form of limited 
expertise and becomes useless. Hence two important requirements: on the one hand, 
no experience, no fact, can be excluded a priori from the philosophical agenda; on the 
other hand, philosophy has to pragmatically seek the broadest empirical truths.  
Second, both radical empiricism and imaginative pragmatism lead the philosopher 
towards the left end of the political spectrum, i.e., to a radically progressive politics. In 
other words: on the one hand, the more you experience, the more you become 
acquainted with the world, the more concern you find for your fellow human beings, 
for other forms of life and eventually for the entire biosphere; on the other hand, the 
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more you think your expanding experiential field, the more you are lured towards the 
concept of the common good. 
We can establish this thesis through the following steps. First, we revisit the 
question of the nature of the difference between philosophy and expertise. Second, 
some definition of the socio-political field is provided. Third, the philosophical gesture 
is specified with a focus on its epistemological dimension. Fourth, consequences are 
drawn in the political field. A short conclusion goes over the stakes again. 
 
1. EXPERIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 
 
Although there is no agreement amongst philosophers on the definition of their 
discipline, it is possible to consider all philosophical discussions from a common 
perspective. For they all select certain experiences to deal with and, in order to achieve 
some systematic understanding of them or at least to obtain some applicable 
generalizations, they apply some kind of method. There are three broad speculative 
possibilities that matter in the context of our argument: radical empiricism, 
empiricism per se and rationalism. All three cast a different light on the 
data/method/outcome cognitive string. 
Primo, from what data do we start? From all experiences whatsoever? If, one 
early morning, I see a pink elephant in my bathroom, this experience should be taken 
prima facie and find an interpretation in my worldview. From some—outer—
experiences? In this case, what is called “factual” concerns only what is disclosed in 
sense-perception and especially in sight; additionally, it is often claimed that facts 
ought to be measurable. From some—inner—experiences? The factual here concerns 
only what is clear and distinct to my mind, and these “facts” do not spring from sense-
perception, from memory or from imagination (all three being notoriously unreliable) 
but from some ideas. 
Secundo, what method do we apply to these data? If all experiences are taken into 
account, only a pragmatic method can allow us to deal with them (James). 
Whitehead’s version of pragmatism takes the form of imaginative generalization. If 
only some outer experiences are to be dealt with, simple observation or a non-critical 
form of (scientific) experimentation is appropriate (Locke). If only some inner 
experiences are worth the attention of the philosopher, a mathesis universalis of sorts will 
do (Descartes). 
Tertio, what is the outcome of the procedure? Radical empiricism’s outcome is 
panpsychism, which involves two arguments. First, experience does not start from a 
conscious subject but from a network of pre-conscious experiences. James carves the 
concept of pure experience in order to name that primordial and pristine reality in 
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which relations are given. Second, that vague, confused, complex and neutral 
experience occasions phenomenal transparency through a triple genesis: our 
conscious experience emerges progressively as the process of individuation takes place 
(ontogenesis), together with socialization (koinogenesis) and after a long biological 
evolution (phylogenesis—see infra §3.3.1). For their parts, empiricism and rationalism 
bring forth similar ontologies. Empiricism’s outcome is materialistic substantialism, 
which also involves two claims. First, experience consists of passively acquired simple 
(particular) ideas; second, these ideas are progressively associated to produce the state 
of consciousness of everyday life: simple (atomic) impressions occasion simple ideas 
that are then associated to progressively obtain more and more complex ideas and a 
unified, conscious experience. Rationalism’s outcome is idealistic substantialism, 
which follows the exact same pattern: innate general ideas are organized by calculus 
to obtain conscious experience. In other words, a close reading of rationalist and 
empiricist arguments reveals that both philosophical streams share the exact same 
substantialism, one rather pluralistic and the other rather monistic.  
Accordingly, radical empiricism is designed to overcome both rationalism (with its 
innate general ideas formatted by calculus) and empiricism (with its acquired particular 
ideas put together by association). It claims that primitive experience is not equivalent 
to elementary experience: empiricists have mixed up the source or origin and the 
element. Experience qua experience—“pure experience” as James calls it—does not 
have at all the simplicity, the atomicity, the individuality that is presupposed by 
rationalists and empiricists alike: it is vague, confused (neither clear nor distinct, 
certainly not rational) and above all relational.  
This heuristic 3x3 matrix of speculative possibilities requires three short 
specifications before we resume the main argument. Primo, there can be of course a 
circularity involved in the definition of the data: the outcome of a given train of 
thought typically serves as rationale for its refinement with the help of data selected for 
their compatibility. The only way to avoid this dogmatic limitation of scope is to 
adopt radical empiricism. Secundo, an additional argument would be needed in order 
to show that there is a conceptual necessity between (i) the three respective types of 
data, (ii) the three methods, and (iii) the three outcomes. Historically, the correlation is 
nevertheless plain obvious. Furthermore, both materialistic and idealistic 
substantialism are degenerate forms of dualistic substantialism.1 Tertio, this argument 
                                                     
1 Whitehead argues that ontological dualism is, by definition, totally incoherent. The only way to sort of 
think two irreconcialiable substances is to invoke a divine intervention. As soon as the “God hypothesis” 
is revoked, dualism degenerates into a one substance ontology. 
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presupposes the triple opening of the world that defines postmodernity: spatial (Cues, 
Bruno), temporal (Spencer, Darwin) and consciential (Myers, Freud).2 
The most relevant question is to define the cognitive string data/method/outcome 
that best matches the philosophical ideal—as it was defined, say, by Socrates—or at 
least to specify which one is the most inclusive. It seems to me that only the radical 
empiricist string both allows the fulfilment of the agenda of philosophy and provides 
an understanding of the other forms of philosophy that exist or have existed. From the 
radical empiricist standpoint, one can make sense of the rational and empirical forms 
of substantialism—whereas substantialism cannot understand radical empiricism.  
In order to keep the argument tight, we will now develop only the first possibility of 
each of the three dimensions of our matrix and thereby seek to clarify James’ and 
Whitehead’s standpoints. 
1.1. DATA: RADICAL EMPIRICISM 
Jamesian scholars have always been tempted to read the philosopher’s corpus only 
from the perspective of his own blend of pragmatism. Sometimes, they have 
complemented this approach with the topic of pluralism. It is obvious to me, as it has 
been to John McDermott, Charlene Haddock Seigfried and Eugene Taylor, that the 
very core of James’ contribution actually lies in his radical empiricism.3 To adopt 
radical empiricism amounts to two moves.  
On the one hand, James argues that only experiences are worthy of philosophical 
inquiry:  
Everything real must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing 
must somewhere be real. (ERE 160) 
In other words: “the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be 
things definable in terms from experience.” (MT xii) James basically asks philosophers 
to centre their speculations on their own first-hand experiences (cf. VRE).  
On the other hand, all experiences should be accepted as evidences: 
We feel things differently according as we are sleepy or awake, hungry or full, 
fresh or tired; differently at night and in the morning, differently in summer and 
in winter, and above all things differently in childhood, manhood, and old age. 
(PP I 232) 
                                                     
2 See our §4.2.3.1. This essay takes over some arguments made in previous works, such as X1. 
3 See, e.g., John J. McDermott, “Life Is in the Transitions: Radical Empiricism and Contemporary 
Concerns,” in Vincent G. Potter (ed.), Doctrine and Experience: Essays in American Philosophy, Fordham 
University Press, 1988, pp. 104-120; Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Chaos and Context. A Study in William 
James, Athens, Ohio, Ohio University Press, 1978; Eugene I. Taylor, William James on Consciousness Beyond 
the Margins, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1983. 
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Taking into account all experiences basically means to open the field of empirical 
evidence as widely as possible. This requirement sweeps away most of Western 
philosophy, which has heavily relied upon sight to find evidences for and against its 
theses. Jonas, for one, has forcefully shown the impact of the metaphor of vision—a 
study that, interestingly enough, might have been directly spurred by Whitehead’s 
own insistence on the issue4—: the metaphor of vision imposes the idea of a spectator-
subject factually unaffected by the scenery or by visceral awareness. The three essential 
characters of vision are: simultaneity of the data presented (instant-like coordinated 
picture), neutralisation of the causality of sense-affection (frozen, non-relational, 
perspective), and distantiation in the spatial and mental senses (totally passive onlooker 
independent of all mundane contingencies). When you think about it, substance 
metaphysics is actually short-sighted. 
Accordingly, simply accepting data from all senses would already constitute a 
tremendous improvement, but James has a far broader field in mind. Whereas sight 
suggests and enforces dualism, the mundane roots of the normal state of consciousness 
(that I call the “zero” state in order to avoid the derogatoriness of the concept of 
“normality” and to suggest straight away the existence of a local hierarchy of states)5 
emerge more and more as soon as the data coming from the other senses are brought 
into consideration: the spectator-subject discovers its embodiedness and its 
embeddeness. Three main types of experiential opening need to be taken into 
account: coenesthesia, relations, and altered states of consciousness. 
Primo, coenesthesia, i.e., the togetherness of exteroception, interoception and 
proprioception, is of importance. Taking exteroception—the five external senses that 
are commonly gathered under the heading “sense perception”—fully into account is 
only the first step. Interoception names the internal sensitivity complementing the 
exteroceptive one. Proprioception names the messages of position and movement 
allowing, with the help of the internal ear’s semi-circular canals a spatialisation—i.e., 
a full (ap)propriation—of the body.  
Secundo, relations deserve to be listed separately by reason of their historical and 
speculative importance. Because Western philosophers have traditionally accepted 
only a limited range of data, the very existence of relations has been sometimes denied 
(Bradley) or only internal relations have been acknowledged (Hegel) or only external 
                                                     
4 Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1966; Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1974, pp. 224-236. With regard to our contention that Jonas has been lured into that critique by his 
acquaintance with Whitehead, see his Wissenschaft als personliches Erlebnis. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1987. 
5 See my X2. 
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relations have been reluctantly accepted (Hume). James takes relations as granted and 
furthermore hints that what was previously explained from the subject-object dualistic 
perspective requires a new understanding that got fully clarified by Whitehead twenty 
years later: relations are vectorial, they are both internal and external.  
Tertio, altered states of consciousness also matter; they range from the very 
common states of dream, absent-mindedness, hypnotism, nausea, automatism, 
hysteria, degeneration, genius, drunkenness and other intoxications, to less frequent 
“pathologies” such as neurosis, hallucinations, multiple personality, schizophrenic 
delusions, demoniacal possession, witchcraft, and religious visions.6 All experiences 
that are at the edges of the zero state, that take place around the threshold of 
consciousness, in the fringes unplundered by substantialism, are of tremendous 
importance for two reasons. First, they bring to the fore data that cannot be ignored if 
one seeks to overcome the ever-present danger of limited expertise and dogmatism. 
Second, they display or advocate for the existence of relations and especially of 
causation.  
1.2. METHOD: IMAGINATIVE PRAGMATISM 
It is well-known that James attempted only at the very end of his life to work out his 
own philosophical system and hence tried to define what philosophy is, or ought to 
be. Although his attempt to circumscribe the philosopher’s attitude, purpose and 
temperament (cf. SPP 6) was never completed, James points at a central trait that is 
likely to be accepted by all philosophical schools and at a gesture that is actually a bit 
more controversial.  
On the one hand, the philosopher seeks ideas of universal scope (SPP 5), a system 
of completely unified knowledge (SPP 27): coherent, logical, necessary and applicable 
(PR 3).7 Such a completely unified system is however unobtainable in a chaosmos, i.e., 
in a world that is in becoming: the philosopher can only create a system that happens 
to fit—but will never match—local contingencies.  
On the other hand, the philosopher’s inquiry is also a personnal quest: philosophy is 
not just a matter of theory but also of practice—in the most existential sense of the 
word. What existential difference does it make to use such and such concepts? Three 
criteria are relevant here: self-transfiguration, ironic dialogue and destinal vision. 
They all point in the same direction: when it exists, the philosophical commitment 
bends the theoretical work. 
                                                     
6 See Eugene I. Taylor’s reconstruction of James’s 1896 Lowell Lectures in William James on Exceptional 
Mental States. The 1896 Lowell Lectures, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1982. 
7 Whitehead was more precise in PR 3. 
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Now, the philosopher who endorses the radical empiricist standpoint is very 
quickly drowned under innumerable experiences of various complexity, intensity, 
value and frequency, some of them being first-hand, others second-hand or even 
imagined. The problem is all the more acute that these nebulae are not static objects 
at all: new experiences keep occurring and they never repeat exactly the same pattern 
as their predecessors (we are not talking about experiments here). If the past is settled 
once and for all, its valuation, interpretation, assessment varies according to the new 
situation. How should she deal with these experiential nebulae? Two stages can be 
distinguished: first, the solution offered by natural processes—pragmatic selection—
and, second, the attitude required by philosophy—pragmatic deselection. 
Primo, the zero-state allows a very sharp awareness of our contemporary world 
and this sharpness is basically achieved by cutting off as much data as possible, 
deeming them irrelevant for survival: “Intensity is the reward of narrowness” (PR 111-
112). This is very straightforward in the context of the biological theory of knowledge 
that sprang from Spencer’s evolutionism and was later generalized by Peirce and 
James.  
Secundo, philosophers need both to become aware of this natural pragmatic 
selection process and to overcome it through a pragmatic deselection. Philosophers, 
like everybody else, usually enjoy a pretty limited experience of the world that is called 
consciousness-zero. Sense-data and behavioural patterns are selected and reinforced 
by habits according to our life contingencies—the shift to a technological society 
bringing furthermore numerous changes to our ethos. Pragmatism acknowledges this 
as a process necessary for everyday purposes. But it is not because most experiences 
are ignored that they are philosophically irrelevant, on the contrary. They are not 
ignored randomly (this is the problem of attention, which comes later), but 
pragmatically. To cut a long story short, “the task of philosophy is to recover the 
totality obscured by the selection” (PR 15). This means that beyond the contingencies 
of everyday life we find a nexus of experiences that actually secure these contingencies 
and provide the conditions of possibility for a meaningful life. Relations—Whitehead 
would say prehensions—are decisive.  
In sum, pragmatic generalization is the only method available for philosophy 
because of the pluralistic, chaosmotic nature of experience. But the late James and the 
equally late Whitehead point at the philosophical necessity of an imaginative form of 
pragmatism. Pragmatism is, in itself, a local method that allows to settle local 
problems. As soon as the philosopher is en route for the big picture, a methodological 
update is required. In a nutshell, the problem is again cosmological: looking for 
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broader generalizations means to reactivate the quest of the principle (archè), i.e., 
exactly what is forbidden by the chaosmos. 
Since the “Whole” is not conceived anymore as a kosmos or a universus but as a 
chaosmos, we never know exactly what comes next. Provided that we accept all 
experiences, we guarantee that our philosophical systematization will evolve 
accordingly. “Ever not quite” is definitively James’s and Whitehead’s motto.8 Last but 
not least, it seems to me that the radical empiricist approach to philosophy is the sole 
one that prevents dogmatism. If one objects that defining philosophy amounts to, ipso 
facto, adopting a normative stance, one has not understood the radical opening that 
James’s empiricism performs and the process context he works. 
The basic requirement is thus experience—all of it. If thought starts from an 
embodied and embedded experience, i.e., that the very existence and significance of 
the body is not denied and that thoughts are rationally articulated in order to be able 
to be shared with fellows human beings, you are necessarily en route for the broadest 
generalities. If thought does not start from an embodied and embedded experience, 
our argument does not apply but it is not falsified for all that. A madman does not 
think, neither does a politician, an economist or a plumber because their experience is 
limited to a certain section of the world and, moreover, because this experience goes 
in loops. 
1.3. OUTCOME: PANPSYCHISM 
If the philosopher accepts all experiences and seeks to extract from them the broadest 
generalities, she is forced to adopt a neutral monism of sorts. The expression itself is not 
to be found in James’s corpus because of its commitment to pluralism. James speaks 
only of a neutral and simple pure experience (ERE 26), but the tension between pure 
experience and pluralism is not pacified until the adoption of the bud theory of 
actuality, that Whitehead will call the epochal theory of time. Only then can we 
understand his mosaic philosophy (ERE 42 and 86). 
This neutral monism constitutes actually a panpsychic worldview. Here also, the 
development of James’s philosophy adumbrates Whitehead’s. All experiences have to 
be taken into account and the most significant of them are not the ones occurring in 
consciousness-zero. This double mistake is typical of Modernity and prevalent in most 
contemporary philosophical schools: it is true that some scholars try to cure this 
blindness but the nosology they invoke is usually psychoanalytical and the patient dies 
uncured… In the same way that Locke improperly imported in psychology Boyle’s 
                                                     
8 WB viii, PU 321; cf. PR 7. 
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corpuscular paradigm, Spencer wrongly used Laplace’s cosmogenetic model of the 
solar system to understand psychogenesis. In the West, it is only in the process-
pragmatic “school” that, thanks to the underground legacy of Myers and Ward, 
prophylaxis has substituted for the analytical cure. 
The proper assessment of the concept of panpsychism involves first the precise 
definition of the incriminated concept and second the study of its adequacy for James. 
First, we need to flesh out the meaning and significance of the concept of 
panpsychism. Like most philosophical concepts, it has been used in various ways and 
carries nowadays a wealth of meaning that generally does not help clarifying the 
debate.9 The question that the concept seeks to answer is properly ontological: what 
can be predicated of all actualities? For the sake of the present short discussion, let us 
examine the two main sources of difficulties and thereby propose a 2x4 hermeneutical 
matrix.  
On the one hand, the prefix “pan” can either refer to the Whole (cf. the concept 
of World-Soul) or to all parts (cf. the concept of hylozoism). A complementary—
Leibnizian—version of that basic contrast is the one between aggregates and 
individuals.10 Please notice that this first partition makes no pretence of exhausting the 
set of possibilities; moreover it indicates the need to specify the relation(s) existing 
between the parts and the whole. 
On the other hand, the root word “psychism” works at various stages or levels that 
can be heuristically identified and hierarchized in the following way. First, it stands 
for psyche or soul itself and, in conjunction with the prefix “pan” leads irresistibly in 
the direction of animism. Second, it stands for subjectivity, i.e., for consciousness or at 
least for an awareness of some sort: self-experience is its key-word. Third, it stands for 
some mental activity, which means capacity of abstraction, of valuation, together with 
some freedom (or spontaneity, depending on how you define your variables). Fourth, 
it stands for pure experience, in the sense that everything that “is” either experiences or is 
experienced—full stop. This is what Whiteheadians call panexperientialism. 
This perspective discloses a developmental and abstractive progression: 
psychism/subjectivity/mentality/experience. As usual in philosophy, the use of 
abstractions is quite paradoxical: it means both the quest for the ultimate 
generalities—that are not (necessarily) obvious for common sense, i.e., there is a 
distantiation from immediate experience—and it claims that, by doing so, the very 
marrow of any experience whatsoever is revealed. Plato’s argument leads him to 
                                                     
9 See David Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West, Cambridge, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Press, 2005. 
10 This difference is stressed by Griffin, e.g., in his Founders of Constructive Postmodern Philosophy. Peirce, James, 
Bergson, Whitehead, and Hartshorne, New York, State University of New York Press, 1993, p. 35n17. 
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claim that solely the contemplation of pure forms is meaningful… because they are 
what is most concrete! This paradox, which stems from the disregard for sense 
perception inherited from Greeks, should lead us to be exceedingly careful in the 
handling of daring generalities. 
Second, the nature and extent of James’s panpsychism needs to be assessed. At 
the very least, it is doubtful that his entire philosophical development belongs to the 
same panpsychic level. One could claim that the above abstractive progression is 
indeed at work in James, who first (already in the Principles) embraced a rather non 
technical (or gut) panpsychism—in 1909, he is still speaking of “mother-sea” or 
“common reservoir of consciousness”11—and later (in the Essays in Radical Empiricism) 
spelled the (dry) basics of a panexperientialist framework.12 The quest for higher 
generalities and the stripping of immediate experience of its “obvious” and 
“subjective” features are the two faces of the same coin. At any rate, these various 
conceptual stops do make sense from the perspective of the “infinite number of 
degrees of consciousness, following the degrees of complication and aggregation of the 
primordial mind-dust.” (PP I 149) 
 
2. THE SOCIO-POLITICAL AXIS 
 
Social and political issues are intrinsically intertwined: for brevity’s sake, one can 
claim that the political pole is nothing but the soul of the social body—the question 
being whether the soul imposes (or should impose) its will on a foreign body or 
whether the soul emerges out of a pre-existing body. Historically, the very idea of 
participatory democracy provides evidence for the later alternative. So does, 
speculatively, process philosophy at large (but other possibilities are also 
contemplated, such as the simultaneous co-development of both poles). 
Three dimensions have to be taken into account in order to think the possible 
socio-political landscapes. They reflect the three characteristics of the creative 
advance of nature, Whitehead’s core idea: creativity, efficacy and vision, that are 
introduced contrapunctally: “We live, as it were, upon the front edge of an advancing 
wave-crest.” (ERE 69; cf. 86-87) 
2.1. INDIVIDUAL 
The individual is without doubt the basic social component—but it is neither a static 
nor an immortal one. Human life, from birth to death, is a growth process that can be 
                                                     
11 William James, “Confidences of a ‘Psychical Researcher’ ”[1909], in EPR 361-375. 
12 Cobb and Griffin proposed the concept of “panexperientialism” in 1977 to name Whitehead’s attitude. 
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depicted with the concept of individuation: through life, each and every one of us 
seeks, willy nilly, his or her own destiny. Autonomy or independence is the key-word 
here. It involves creativity and freedom (see the §3.2.3.2). This is what Greeks called 
archein.13 
Creativity means the irruption of the unheard, of the unexpected and the 
unforeseeable. This, in turn, involves the ending of a past causal chain and the 
beginning of a new one. In common philosophical parlance, it refers to process and 
becoming and also to natality and birth. It necessitates the concepts of epochality 
(Whitehead’s “epochal theory of time” that amounts to James’s bud-like experience) 
and liberty because difference necessarily involves discontinuity and discontinuity is 
the signature of a free decision of sorts. Liberty, conceived at the broadest scale, 
amounts more to spontaneity than to free-choice. The point is to distinguish with 
Bergson liberty qua option-picking from liberty qua creation. We are free when we are 
creative. If freedom consists only of choosing between pre-existing alternatives, we are 
actually not free at all since we are strictly bound by these options. The liberium 
arbitrium is ultimately a servum arbitrium.  
2.2. COMMUNITY 
Although it makes sense to understand community from the perspective of the 
interactive aggregation of individuals in the making, the argument can be made that 
community always comes first, that no individual was ever born in a social vacuum 
(but he can die of course in a social void). There is no pre-social individual but one 
can imagine a pre-contractual one. Solidarity or heteronomy is what matters here, 
i.e., some form of efficacy and determinism. 
 Efficacy basically means the power of the past, the stubborn reproduction of 
existing patterns—that consist either of previous events or of atemporal archetypes 
(PR’s eternal objects). In common philosophical parlance, it refers to being and 
necessitates the concepts of continuity and determinism: the efficacy of the past fosters 
the same patterns for ever. In other words, repetition involves blind continuity. It 
belongs to potentiality or virtuality,14 i.e., to the pervasive past and its physical time—
but also to the continuous transition towards an impending future. Objectification 
and superjection are two faces of the same processual coin. Whitehead’s concept of 
satisfaction names another type of prattein: to pass through one to get to the other:15 the 
                                                     
13 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1958, p. 177; see p. 
189. 
14 To differentiate potentiality, virtuality and actuality, see The Basics, ch. VI. 
15 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, op. cit., p. 189. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 215 
achievement of the subjective process of concrescence and the toppling into mundane 
objective endurance and divine everlastingness.16  
2.3. CULTURE 
The double tension between the individual and the community, between 
independence and interdependence, is at the root of Jamesian pluralism: there are 
genuine individuals endowed with an existential trajectory incommensurable with any 
other and, yet, they all belong to the one same community that benefits from their 
idiosyncrasies, reinforces them and bends them toward the common interest. A strong 
community requires—and fosters—strong individuals. Dewey has seen this very 
clearly, e.g., in “Creative democracy: The task before us.”17 
The same dialectic can be founded with Whitehead’s actual entities and nexûs or 
with his mental and physical “poles.” It is also at work at a deeper level: “The 
individuality of entities is just as important as their community. The topic of religion is 
individuality in community.” (RM 86) 
The imaginary institution of society conditions personal growth so that it is likely 
to contribute to social growth—while the imaginary institution of individuals brings 
social progress. (Growth and progress are used here in their original existential 
meaning as inspired by their biological meaning. Econometrics is totally irrelevant.) 
There is, in other words, a common sense that inspires the best definition of culture: 
culture provides the grand narrative that allows the merging of the conditions of 
possibility of individuation and of socialization. As a result, in a community where a 
genuine culture prevails, all citizens are animated with a sense of social duty that takes 
the form of a sacerdotal citizenship: the personal spiritual quest and the enforcement 
of the common good do coincide. This was at the very least plain in Athenian 
participatory democracy. The Judeo-Christian creation narrative constitutes probably 
the best recent historical exemplification of Western culture. But France’s Third 
Republic motto—liberté, égalité et fraternité—and the Bildungsroman offer, 
respectively, a global and a local instance that seems more likely to be universally 
adopted. 
Traditionally, the political “right” insists on the individual and the necessity to 
give as much elbow-room to free will as possible, whereas the “left” argues that 
community values should come first. This simplistic stance has not lost its validity but 
it gains applicability when it is properly defined with the help of the concept of social 
                                                     
16 See The Basics, op. cit., pp. 226 sq. 
17 J. Boydston (Ed.),  John Dewey: The later works, 1925–1953, Carbondale,  Southern Illinois University 
Press, volume 14, pp. 224-230. 
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horizon that is used in the section 3.2 below in order to refresh the concepts of class, 
class consciousness and class struggle. 
Vision basically designates an eschatological horizon, a melioristic open trend—not 
a teleological one. In common philosophical parlance, it refers to God’s luring of all 
existences. It necessitates the concepts of (hierarchies of) universals (or eternal objects) 
and of (primordial nature of) god. In a purely metaphorical way, it can be attached to 
the future. Creativity is wild and efficacy is blind. Only some vision can orientate the 
gearing of creativity and efficacy towards the best possible world. It is important to 
notice here that Whitehead does not offer any demonstration of the existence of God. 
Since God belongs to PR’s “Derivative Notions,” not to its “Categoreal Scheme,” it 
could even be argued that God is not a metaphysical necessity, only a contingent 
cosmological feature of our “cosmic epoch.” Gnosticism would not be far. 
To offer an anthropomorphic exemplification: creativity refers to novelty, 
invention; efficacy to causation, repercussion of past actions, and vision to horizon 
and projection of oneself in a more or less imaginary future. If we refine these 
conceptual mile-stones, we come to the concepts of, respectively, event (or accident, in 
the Aristotelian sense of sumbebekos), plastic structure, and divine eschaton. The structure 
is plastic because it is both a condition of possibility of eventfulness and a consequence 
of it. The history of philosophy offers three interesting complementary instantiations 
of these functors: Heraclitus, who insists on becoming, seemingly refusing any 
speculative worth to being; Parmenides, who attempts on the contrary to think 
exclusively the Absolute Being; and Plotinus’ hierarchy of beings (or, alternatively, 
Teilhard, with his noodynamics and omega-point). In Arendt’s interpretation of the 
Greeks, vision is of course theorein,18 but a theorein that is a contact rather than a 
contemplation per se.  
 
3. ON EPISTEMOLOGICAL BLINDNESS 
 
Now that the background of our discussion is settled, a more specific argument can be 
provided. This section is directly inspired by James’s “On a certain blindness in 
human beings,” a lecture delivered in 1892 and originally published in Talks to Teachers 
on Psychology (1899). It provides the bridge between the epistemological issues lying at 
the core of the philosophical enterprise and the political consequences that should be 
drawn from them. 
                                                     
18 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind. One-volume edition, San Diego, New York, London, Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1978. 
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3.1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
The historical context in which James delivers his lecture is itself quite eloquent. 
Three points deserve to be mentioned, starting with the most general one. 
3.1.1. Monroe Doctrine, 1823 
The broadest background of James’s political stance is the Monroe Doctrine, that 
developed in three stages.  
The first one is the presidential message delivered by Monroe in 1823, directly 
inspired by his Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, to reply, on the one hand, to 
France’s intention to dispatch troops in Hispanic America in order to support and 
foster Spanish monarchies and, on the other, to Russia, that was ogling Oregon after 
Alaska. Monroe made two claims: the US will not tolerate any European intervention 
in the Americas; and the US will not intervene in European politics.  
The second stage consists of the nebulous and dogmatic glorification of the US 
written for Ulysses Grant by his Secretary of State Hamilton Fish in 1870. Its rationale 
is the following: the US will not support the Cuban revolution against the Spanish 
colons if the UK agrees to pay war damages for the support they have granted to the 
Confederates during the Civil War. The British agreed and paid in 1872 but the US 
nevertheless invaded Cuba in 1898.  
The third stage occurs with the affirmative Biblical imperialism of McKinley, 
Roosevelt, Lodge, Taft and Wilson: the US take South America under their wing to 
protect it against European colonialism. Hence the possibility of pre-emptive wars 
and the shameless affirmation of imperialism thereafter. 
3.1.2. Cuban war and Philippines wars, 1898 
The year 1898 sees the start of two important conflicts: the Cuban war (April 21), 
seemingly a consequence of the unexplained explosion of the USS Maine (Feb. 15), 
and the Philippines war (May 1st).  
3.1.3. The American Anti-Imperialist League, 1898 
Some intellectuals were not, however, among the warmongers. On June 15th, the 
American Anti-Imperialist League is established to battle the annexation of the 
Philippines. James becomes a dedicated member of the League from 1899 until 1910, 
the year of his death. 
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3.2. BASIC CLAIMS: PLURALISM AND COMMON SENSE 
In his Preface to Talks to Teachers, James introduced “On a certain blindness in human 
beings” with two main ideas: first, whatever “truth” is and whatever/whoever “God” 
is, they are different, i.e., there is some ontological surplus, some experiential opacity; 
second, the individual perceiver can never properly communicate his experience, 
which means that language and rationality break down at some point. 
In fact, three complementary claims are made in his enduring pluralistic argument: 
the opacity of facts, the privacy of minds and the existence of a “common sense.” 
3.2.1. Opacity of facts 
James’ epistemological pluralism manifests itself first of all in his advocacy of the 
opacity of factual experiences, which basically means that we experience more than 
what we are conscious of and more than we can conceive or rationalize. Needless to 
say, this opacity cannot be clarified, but only partially circumscribed. To do so we 
propose two stages. 
3.2.1.1. Experiential wealth 
First, the opacity is due to the fact that we experience more than what we are 
conscious of: the data available in consciousness-zero constitute only the tip of the 
experiential iceberg, they are neither the sole data available, directly or indirectly, nor 
the most relevant ones for philosophy. 
The fact that what we consciously experience is only a part of our total experience is 
usually not welcomed by professional philosophers unless they are under the spell of 
psychoanalysis.  
3.2.1.2. Nonrationality 
Second, we experience more than we can conceive or rationalize: what we 
consciously experience is only partially rational and what we unconsciously 
experience is largely—but not entirely—symbolical.  
Of course the two issues blend into one another: experiential wealth induces 
nonrationality and nonrationality manifests itself in the buzzing confusion. Whereas 
idealists understand the universe as purely transparent to reason (what is rational is 
real and what is real is rational), radical empiricists understand it as made of elements 
that should be seen as asymptotic experiences and variegated relations. In the 
Jamesian lexicon: the privacy of the skulls and the innumerableness of their binding 
appendices. 
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3.2.2. Privacy of minds 
Pluralism does not manifest itself only in factual opacity but also in mental privacy. 
Whether we are awake or asleep, we mysteriously keep our identity. Here again we 
can distinguish two complementary issues: we are not fully transparent to ourselves—
and neither are our fellow human beings transparent to us.  
3.2.2.1. Who am I?  
First, we are not fully transparent to ourselves: 
My present field of consciousness is a centre surrounded by a fringe that shades 
insensibly into a subconscious more. I use three separate terms here to describe 
this fact; but I might as well use three hundreds, for the fact is all shades and no 
boundaries. (PU 288) 
Even if I am an experienced radical empiricist (no pun intended), I still cannot make 
sense of my immediate experience and even less of my entire journey. Perhaps I will 
intuit in a glimpse what really matters and act accordingly, but this will remain to a 
large extent a pre-rational and private issue. Some of us have an intense introspective 
life, others accumulate experiences through social intercourse, reading, travel or have 
a talent to envisage the universal interconnectedness. Yet others have an intense 
religious faith or even have enjoyed natural or drug-induced altered states. None is 
able to answer this simple question: who am I? 
3.2.2.2. Who is s/he? 
Second, this privacy does also apply to others. James has often emphasized this, for 
instance quoting Josiah Royce (The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, 1885, pp. 157-162): 
What, then, is our neighbor? […] He seems to thee a little less living than thou; 
his life is dim, it is cold, it is a pale fire beside own desires. (TT 241) 
This is plain common sense unless you are endowed with the spurious behaviouristic 
faith—in that case, although you cannot access to your own experience, you are fully 
able to elucidate someone else’s. 
Overall, we are all haunted by a sense of intrinsic difference and peculiar destiny. 
Even nowadays in massified societies where people are made to conform even in their 
dissent, everyone still cling to their pressuposed difference and is willing to fuse with the 
first heroic archetype fed to him. 
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3.2.3. Common sense 
In sum, factual opacity and mental privacy are not only due to the complexity of our 
world (that could be understood statically) or the limitation of our faculties, intuitions 
and/or linguistic skills, but to its process character: opacity and privacy are basically 
experiential and experience happens, it does not last. Please notice that this also 
means that each new experience is incommensurable with all past experiences. Even 
if it somehow repeats a past event, taking place in the exact same spatial standpoint 
and reproducing the exact same experiential pattern, it is not the same event for the 
simple reason that it cannot take place in the same spot of the extensive continuum, 
which is, in the Whiteheadian lexicon, the matrix of solidarity that underlies all 
events. 
However, pointing at experiential opacity and privacy constitutes only half of the 
story. The argument needs to be pushed in two additional directions: on the one 
hand, despite the nebulous aspects of inner and outer experiences, we all share a 
common world; on the other hand, the basic reason for this lies in the panpsychic 
nature of experience. 
3.2.3.1. Consensual interobjectivity 
Despite the tensions that exist between, say, a forest settler and a Boston Brahmin, a 
common world is shared within or even without a given culture. You are a 
cosmopolitan philosophical aristocrat living in buzzing cities surrounded by 
sophisticated intellectuals and multiple contraptions but when you meet a simple 
fellow, poorly if at all educated, dwelling in the woods and enjoying voluntary 
simplicity you cannot but acknowledge that his factual opacity, however remote from 
your own, somehow reaches the universal nexus of experiences that classical 
philosophers called “reality.” His vision is not yours, but it makes sense and could 
become yours. Moreover, his mental privacy will manifest itself in such a way that you 
will not doubt of his humanity and perhaps that you will even look forward to his 
company. Such is the mystery of friendship, as it stands out in Aristotle and 
Augustinus. 
3.2.3.2. Panpsychism 
That sympathetic experience can be extended to other forms of life. Granted, we feel 
particularly close to mammals, and especially to those that share our everyday life, but 
it is not difficult to recover, or to build, our sense of sympathy for all life forms and, 
gradually, for the entire biosphere. James and Whitehead came to believe, especially 
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in their late years, that no valid argument can be made to break the proximity 
between types of existence and forms of being. To establish an ontological gap 
between types or grades of experience would amount to renewing the mistake of 
substantialism.  
The technicalities of this claim are not always easy to work out in details but the 
basics are straightforward enough: as soon as you acknowledge the humanity of some 
of your fellow humans, you are necessarily led to acknowledge the community of 
feeling19 that exists with all other humans and, step by step, you become aware of the 
unity of the pluriverse. The concept of pure experience is the heir of one epiphany: 
opacity is privacy and privacy is opacity—what matters is the standpoint that one 
seeks to express. 
3.3. THREE CASES OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL BLINDNESS 
Finally, let us mention three topics that are presupposed by our analysis and that have 
important parallelism in political matters, which is the subject of our next section. 
3.3.1. Opacity presupposes factual selection 
Our analysis presupposes the genesis of consciousness-zero through the selection of 
data: awareness becomes sense-perception through a triple genesis: experience is not 
amalgamated by calculus or by association from simple to complex, but emerges from 
complex to simple. 
First, the cognitive functions of the human mind are not static operators at all, 
they are the transient phylogenetical result of a long adaptive process (see Spencer, 
Principles of Psychology, 1855). Under the pressure of environmental adjustment (better 
knowledge allows a better chance for survival), the human intellect has become a 
master in the logic of solid bodies and “Aristotelian” logic, but this is just an 
evolutionary adjustment to a limited—perceived—segment of a throbbing and 
coalescing world. In sum: the categories that are a priori for the individual are a 
posteriori for the species. This is nothing but the very root of pragmatism. 
Second, these functions result furthermore from an ontogenetical process: individuals 
are not born fully equipped with the rational apparatus embodied in adult’s 
consciousness-zero (see Piaget, La représentation du monde chez l'enfant, 1926). Four 
temporally and logically sequenced stages can be distinguished: the sensorimotor stage 
(ages 0–2) during which sense perception and spatial movement are tuning-in to 
                                                     
19 Feeling is the term that James sometimes uses for pure experience (SPP 94, etc.) and that Whitehead 
chose to name the vectorial relations binding all events (PR 23, et passim). 
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explore the world; the preoperational stage (ages 2–7) that coordinates motor skills 
with little significant mental actions on objects; the concrete operational stage (ages 7–
11) which exhibits logical thinking only about concrete operations directed at objects 
and events; and the formal operational stage (ages 11–adult) which exhibits the ability 
to think and reason abstractly on a representation of the world.20 
Third, the evolutionary success of humans also lies in the fortunate 
oversimplifications the species has achieved and perpetuates through cultural 
endeavours (see Bateson, Naven, 1936). Koinogenesis21 is the process of socialization qua 
convergence of individual consciousnesses through learning. It is a process of 
integrative synchronic tuning that can be contrasted with schismogenesis—or 
progressive and pathological differentiation.22  
Last but not least, not all the data that are produced by the triple genesis are 
actually entertained: attention provides yet another filter. In sum: the transition from 
factual opacity to perceptive transparency takes place through a triple genesis. Factual 
selection means the creation of facts from experiences. 
3.3.2. Privacy presupposes a mental blind spot 
That triple genesis explains how the past “objective” world brings about the 
contemporary “subjective” one. It is only by metaphor that James writes on how 
“mind brings things together.”23 As Whitehead claimed, well-tempered process 
philosophy “is a recurrence to pre-Kantian modes of thought” (PR xi): the idea of the 
construction of phenomena and of the importance of subjectivity is kept in process 
philosophy, but the categorical work is replaced by the triple genesis and 
anthropocentrism is gone. The reformed subjectivism that is advocated works within a 
panpsychist worldview: according to Kant, subjects bring objects into phenomenality; 
according to Whitehead, past subjects bring contemporary subjects into existence. 
The blind spot is not another name for the transcendental ego but a metaphor for 
the inadequacy of consciousness-zero. Experience in the making cannot be fully 
                                                     
20 Wolfe Mays’ “introduction” to Piaget’s Principles of Genetic Epistemology points at the fact that the stages of 
learning are not quite linear but exhibit a dialectical pattern of a depassement. There is a kind of return 
through a re-appropriation at a higher level that contains what was not even present at the earlier stage. 
(London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972) 
21 From koinos, meaning “common,” “public.” I picked the concept in order to contrast Bateson’s 
schismogenesis and later realized that Cornélius Castoriadis made basically the same claim in L'institution 
imaginaire de la société (Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1975). 
22For Bateson’s term, see e.g., “Culture Contact and Schismogenesis,” Man XXXV, 1935, pp. 178-183, 
reprinted in Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind. Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, 
and Epistemology, London, Intertext Books, 1972, pp. 61-72.  
23 “Knowing of Things Together,” 1894/1895, reprinted in CER. 
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rationalized: it can only be fully experienced—felt, enjoyed. Consciousness-zero, 
strictly speaking, is a consciousness of the past; reason works with data that are not 
actual, only past. As soon as we are fully immersed in the experience, rationality is 
bypassed.  
Interestingly enough, this contrast between immersion in experience (or 
awareness) and emersion in consciousness is at work whether you interpret it from the 
perspective of a pure flux (i.e., of continuity) or from the perspective of a sequenced 
flux (i.e., of epochal contiguity). In the former, there is simply no spot at all but dark 
fluxes; in the later, the spot is embodied in the contemporary duration defining the 
concrescent experience. 
3.3.3. Common sense presupposes cultural bias 
The common sense that binds private and public aspects of experience is always, in its 
concreteness, culturally determined—and this brings to the fore precisely the topic of 
our next section. Each individual belongs to a certain social horizon or Umwelt and 
only a few core experiences actually overlap with all horizons: Griffin’s hard-core 
common sense beliefs that are inevitably presupposed in practice, even if denied in 
theory. The main ones are: there is a world lying outside of our experience and 
mentation; this world is structured by physical causality; our volition can bend this 
causality; freedom thus constitutes an important dimension (however fleeting and 
rarely actualized) of our existences.24 
 
4. BLINDNESS IN POLITICAL MATTERS 
 
Let us now repeat our argument in the context of politics.  
4.1. WAR AND PEACE 
First, here is the broad context as provided by Whitehead’s and by James’s respective 
legacies. 
4.1.1. Whitehead’s appeal to sanity, 1939 
Whitehead has unfortunately left very few indications with regard to his personal 
political stance and the political consequences of his organic philosophy. The basic 
conceptual tool he manipulates in the adjacent field of the history of ideas and of 
                                                     
24 Cf. David Ray Griffin and Huston Smith, Primordial Truth and Postmodern Theology, Albany, New York, 
State University of New York Press, 1989. 
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civilizations is actually borrowed from Plato’s onto-theological speculations. The rise 
and fall of cultures would exemplify the struggle of two antagonistic forces: persuasion 
towards common Adventure versus coercion leading to individual and social sclerosis.  
In March 1939, Whitehead seems to briefly wake up from his political slumber 
when he publishes in Boston’s Atlantic Monthly his “Appeal to Sanity.” His analysis is, 
however, rather dispassionate even though it claims to assess its topic with the concept 
of emotion:  
To-day—he writes—the world is plunged in this second phase of contagious 
emotion. […] The point to notice is that war, even if successful, can only 
increase the malignant excitement. The remedy is peace, fostering the slow 
growth of civilized feelings. War may be necessary to guard world civilization. 
But for Central Europe the effective remedy is peace. (ESP 53-56) 
Strangely, he further invokes the possibility of a miracle to solve the crisis.25 So the very 
first meaning of our title refers to Whitehead’s political blindness and to the chronic 
weakness of Whiteheadian political studies. Intellectuals—and especially academics—
totally fail their mission when they lack political commitment. 
4.1.2. Remarks at the peace banquet, 1904 
To assess the political significance of Whiteheadian process philosophy, we have thus 
basically the choice between James’s and Dewey’s respective historical commitments. 
Here primary and secondary literatures are burgeoning but, as far as I know, no 
political argument has ever succeeded to sail close to the radical empiricist wind. 
Pragmatist approaches are championed, sometimes assisted with pluralistic premises.  
First of all, it is easy to identify James’s stance. For the Bostonian philosopher, 
duty and reverence are more anchored in political experience than in pedagogical 
and metaphysical speculations. James sees that scholarship and commitment are 
intertwined—a point Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) repeatedly made only a few 
decades later. 
The first lecture that is worth citing in this context is James’s 1904 “Remarks at 
the Peace Banquet,” made the year he became Vice-President of the national Anti-
Imperialist League: 
Our permanent enemy is the noted bellicosity of human nature. Man, 
biologically considered […] is simply the most formidable of all beasts of prey, 
and, indeed, the only one that preys systematically on its own species. We are 
once for all adapted to the military status. A millennium of peace would not 
                                                     
25 “Of course, miracles do happen; but it is unwise to expect them” (ESP 58); “miracles are always 
possible” (ESP 60). 
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breed the fighting disposition out of our bone and marrow, and a function so 
ingrained and vital will never consent to die without resistance, and will always 
find impassioned apologists and idealizers. […]. The plain truth is that people 
want war. (MS 300-304) 
Really, there is “something wrong about us as we naturally stand” (VRE 508)—but 
how could we be saved from this wrongness? “We must cheat our foe, circumvent 
him in detail, not try to change his nature.” (MS 304) James remains nevertheless 
evasive on the preventive cure of sorts that is needed: one cannot dispose of martial 
virtues, “man lives by habits indeed, but what he lives for is thrills and excitements.” 
(MS 303) Perhaps that a bit of educative work would do to responsibilize individuals, 
especially the political “leaders” and other economical “shakers and movers”? 
Actually not. 
4.1.3. The Moral Equivalent of War, 1906 
Let us face it: “History is a bath of blood” (MS 269). “The Moral Equivalent of War” 
(1910) claims that pacifists need to proactively invent substitute outlets and sublimated 
forms of the military life:  
Martial virtues must be the enduring cement; intrepidity, contempt of softness, 
surrender of private interest, obedience to command, must still remain the rock 
upon which states are built. […] The martial virtues, although originally gained 
by the race through war, are absolute and permanent human goods. goods. 
Patriotic pride and ambition in their military form are, after all, only 
specifications of a more general competitive passion. (MS 287-288) 
“New outlets for heroic energy” (MS 306) are needed. Therefore James proposes to 
replace military service by a civil service in order to inflame the civic temper just as 
“past history has inflamed the military temper” (MS 293).  
The Jamesian pragmatic trick is very seductive but how practical is it? It brings to 
mind the utopia that the late Huxley wrote: Island (1962). Community should foster 
individuation, and this process benefits from some physical, mental and spiritual 
training indeed. Initiation is its experiential keystone. 
4.2. BASIC CLAIMS: PLURALISM AND COMMON PRAXIS 
Whitehead provided an alternative formulation of the radical empiricist axiom when 
he argued that the task of philosophy is to recover the totality obscured by the selection—never 
ever to add an extra process of exclusion. The very same holds for political 
philosophy.  
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How can we avert the chief danger of narrowness? In order not to repeat the 
exact same argument as the one unfolded in the previous section, it is necessary to 
introduce a new type of experience, one specific to socio-political issues, and to 
proceed from there. Here is how the argument is adjusted: factual opacity is 
embodied in the opacity of class awareness; mental privacy becomes the privacy of 
class consciousness; common sense is replaced by a common praxis that binds and 
separates citizens: the class struggle. 
4.2.1. Opacity of classes 
The first thing to do is to define the concept of class that is put to work in our 
argument. It will not directly rely upon Marx for two reasons. Primo, we need a 
broader argument, independent of the question of the relations of production: if there 
is such a thing as social classes, they mould the social tissue in a deeper way. In other 
words: everything should be done to avoid reading Marx as reducing all that matters 
in human experience to economics and, by the same token, adopting a blind 
materialism. Economic materialism can aptly describe the ideological core of the XXth 
and XXIst century. It has had only nefarious consequences, both in capitalist and in 
communist societies. Moreover, in light of Whitehead’s remarks on the vacuity of 
materialism,26 it is plain obvious that Marx could be rescued from such a short-sighted 
vision of cosmic evolution. Secundo, we should not seek the same universality of the 
concept of class per se: class struggle is a praxis that has only fairly recently replaced 
another form of social polarization: cast alliances. 
The starting point of our radical empiricist overhaul should be experiential. There 
is a very concrete experience that is usually ignored outside sociological studies: the 
existence of a sociological horizon that corresponds to what Whitehead calls our 
“actual world” and von Uexküll (after von Baer but independently of Peirce) 
“Umwelt.”27 The Umwelt is similar to a soap bubble or a cobweb that would be 
animated by two virtues: on the one hand, the living organism in question is largely 
defined by its relational tissue; on the other hand, the horizon incorporates 
interferences between different worlds and accounts for the relativity of the perceptual 
community. Scale effects do of course matter: the world of the ant is not the one of 
the mole. The Welt is a mosaic of Umwelten. 
Humans are born with the smallest experiential—and social—horizon possible: 
themselves. It is only very slowly that the interpersonal world of the infant grows and 
                                                     
26 SMW 107. 
27 The concept of Umwelt has been instrumental in the development of a zoo- or bio-semiotics and its 
phenomenological blend (Husserl, Heidegger, Goffman, Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze) 
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that her horizon expands. Slowly gently, the infant appropriates movements, spaces, 
forms of mentation, temporalities, abstractions… and her surrounding world grows 
accordingly.  
Freely inspired by Uexküll’s ethological work on the Umwelt, here is how I propose 
to define and to refine the concept of class.28 A class is an unconsciously lived 
(experiential) territory. For simplicity’s sake, we could arbitrarily reduce its dimensions 
to three: a lived space, a lived duration, and lived values—but a more shaded 
approach adds of course considerable weight to this concept. Qua unconscious, the 
lived territory involves an internal boundary and an external boundary, which were, 
mutatis mutandis, also foreseen by James. I mention between brackets Uexküll’s relevant 
concepts. 
4.2.1.1. Internal boundary 
The internal boundary is embodied in the physical standpoint of the subject 
considered; it is from that existential nucleus that the horizon itself is outlined. “The 
knower is not simply a mirror floating with no foot-hold anywhere.”29 There is no 
unembodied standpoint; the “lived body”30 can be analyzed in two complementary 
worlds: primo, the presented world (“Gegenwelt”), i.e., the environment as 
apprehended (constructed) by the central nervous system; secundo, the innerworld 
(“Innenwelt”), made of affectivity, interoception, proprioception and imaginative 
projections. 
4.2.1.2. External boundary 
The external boundary is constituted by the social horizon itself (“Umwelt”). The 
fringes or “surrounding-world” can be analysed in two steps: primo, the perceived 
world (“Merkwelt”) woven by education, values, (over-)consumption…; secundo, the 
operational world (“Wirkwelt”) which is the sociographical area defined by the 
subject’s action in space and time. 
In order to delineate how exactly do the internal and external boundaries relate to 
the opacity of classes, we need to shift to the next stage. 
                                                     
28 Jakob von Uexküll, Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen: Ein Bilderbuch unsichtbarer Welten, 
Berlin, J. Springer, 1934. 
29 William James, “Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind as Correspondance,” 1878, reprinted in CER 67. 
30 It would be interesting to develop this concept along some of the lines suggested by Merleau-Ponty’s 
“lived body.” 
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4.2.2. Privacy of class consciousness 
The existence of social classes is a given, a presentation that is not necessarily represented. 
To use a metaphor: all human beings live in a bubble that is more or less extended, 
more or less transparent and more or less pervious to her fellows’ whereabouts. 
However, because of personal circumstances not always purposely sought, some 
individuals become conscious of the existence of their own class and therefore pave 
the way for a new understanding of social intercourse.  
The class qua consciously represented territory involves the boundaries mentioned in 
the previous section: it mobilizes either nuclear or liminal perspectives, or both. 
4.2.2.1. Nuclear representation 
From the perspective of the internal boundary, the nuclear standpoint becomes 
conscious when it is contrasted with other standpoints—and this involves three main 
characteristics: age, gender and race. More subtle cultural categories could be evoked 
as well to specify the nuclear representation, but these three mark out adequately the 
territory at stake. 
4.2.2.2. Liminal representation 
From the perspective of the external boundary, the horizon itself gets so to speak 
fleshed out when one realizes that there is, if not actually, at least potentially, an 
overlap of horizons.31 This step of the argument introduces a presupposition: the 
existence of some local form of social hierarchy. Some people have more family and 
friends than others, some have friends from various horizons, some pick them only 
within their neighbours or their colleagues, while others have so to speak a far 
broader sample of social personalities: some citizens have simply access to a richer 
experience than others. The old metaphor of the social pyramid is thus useful to fuel 
the discussion; what is presupposed is then made explicit by the analysis. Please notice 
that no global hierarchy is either presupposed or demonstrated: precisely because we 
are condemned to speak from a certain sociological standpoint, the opacity of our 
horizon prevents an all-embracing vision. At the global level, the social circumstance 
could equally be depicted as a coral rather than a tree. This is, mutatis mutandis, the 
same question as Darwin’s.32  
                                                     
31 A parallel topology can be found in Edward T. Hall’s proxemics. 
32 What exactly was on Darwin’s agenda? Did he really intend to argue for one single tree of life and 
hence for one single evolutionary scale of consciousness? Is that pyramidal concept furthermore worthy 
of the pragmatic standpoint? The fact is that the single illustration that enriches On the Origin of Species (in 
chapt. 4) does not share the characteristics of Haeckel’s more well-known tree: it basically pictures 
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To understand the different possible overlappings, three criteria matter. 
First, the horizonal size: some individuals have a far bigger horizon than others. This 
is really an experiential matter. Physical, mental and spiritual growths, that are 
supposed to be enforced together by a proper upbringing and an adequate education, 
should, by definition, amount to increasing the size of the experiential horizon of the 
members of the community. However, size matters only in so far as it increases the 
probability of the awareness of qualitatively different experiences. Hence the two 
following dual characteristics. 
Second, the elongation of the horizon and its direction: what is the shape of 
the horizon and how is that shape orientated in the social power field? A very wide 
horizon that includes only experiences of the same type does not really prepare the 
subject to become conscious of the social stakes: it defines a shallow horizon covering 
similar experiences; another way of putting it is to speak of an horizontal horizon within 
the social pyramid or field. A vertical horizon is an elongated horizon that runs 
through multiple levels of the pyramid: although both types of horizon could have the 
same size, their significance is completely different. In sum, every citizen belongs to a 
social horizon that is defined by its size and orientated shape: a big horizon is always 
preferable but an horizontally elongated horizon does not have the same impact on 
social consciousness as a vertically elongated one. 
Third, the centration of the subject and her projection clarify how the subject 
values her position within her horizon. Primo, the subject is rarely centred within his 
horizon: usually she has a better knowledge of some areas encompassed by the 
horizon than others. Secundo, the subject is never statically (de)centred: there is 
always a tropism that brings her towards some parts of the horizon. Most of the time, 
the subject is attracted by the lifestyle of the upper classes. But sometimes the ideal of 
voluntary simplicity scale down her social agenda. 
In conclusion, the opacity of classes can be partially made conscious within a 
private subjectivity but this does not necessarily awake the subject to the ethos that 
drives the actors. 
4.2.3. Common praxis 
Once the private class consciousness is obtained through the consideration of 
overlapping horizons or territories, the subject becomes able to rationalize its 
                                                                                                                                           
human races as one of the currently most evolved organisms, not as the sole pinnacle of natural selection. 
Darwin’s vision is dramatically different, as his notebooks make plain. In July 1837, shortly after his 
return from renowned Beagle voyage (1831–1836), he drew a coral-like diagram and wrote that “the tree of 
life should perhaps be called the coral of life” (B Notebook, p. 25). Darwin’s natural selection does not 
necessarily involve either anthropocentrism or progress. 
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meaning and significance. When different private consciousnesses are shared, i.e., 
rationally discussed, another step is crossed and the meta-concept of class struggle can 
be obtained. 
In a nutshell: so far we have dealt with the statics of the system; we now have to 
understand its dynamics. Currently, Western and Westernized societies (the reality 
behind the politics of “globalization” and its fancy literature) are ruled by the class 
struggle—but this hasn’t been always the case, and one cannot but hope that it will 
not continue to be the case. A quick overview of three important historical stages that 
such hope implies is helpful. 
One of the oldest social ethos is the hierarchically differentiated cast-based 
communities. Their basic modus operandi is the cast alliance that provides a rigid social 
organization, which means less opportunities for the subject to change his social status 
but also more cohesion and, overall, more meaning. An individual born into slavery is 
likely to die into slavery, but his owner has a direct interest in keeping him alive and 
well. Proletarians are unlikely to raise above their ill-birth and the capitalist should 
only worry about paying the minimal wage possible. The reproduction of the stock is 
not always a concern since foreign work power is available (that is before plants were 
actually delocalized).  
4.2.3.1. Class struggle 
The current ethos is the class struggle. It was brought to the fore by a triple opening 
or deterritorialization.  
Primo, the spatial opening that started in the XVth century with the enclosures, 
was carried on with Columbus’ “discovery” (1492) and crowned with the works of 
Cues, Copernicus and Bruno. The Greek given kosmos, that gave its premises to the 
Christian created mundus, was about to become a pluriverse and its finite hierarchy, 
infinite. 
Secundo, the temporal opening originates in the transformation of the concepts of 
growth and progress, that used to be private matters, into public realities by the works 
spreading from Herder (1764) to Condorcet (1793). It was then carried on by the 
speculation around the biological theory of evolution by Spencer (Principles of 
Psychology, 1855), Wallace and Darwin.  
Tertio, the consciential openings. Usually scholars mention only Freud’s 
Traumdeutung (1900), but Freud dogmatized a broader (and deeper) conceptual and 
therapeutical revolution that goes back to Leibniz and Mesmer, the Nancy and 
Salpêtrière schools, and psychophysics. Political openings have to be mentioned as 
well (the Republiek der Zeven Verenigde Nederlanden, 1579–1632; the Bloodless Revolution, 
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1688; The Boston Tea Party, 1773; the French revolution, 1789), alongside religious 
reformation (Luther, 1517).  
As a result of all these openings: the social model shifted from perpetual clockwork 
(Claude Lévi-Strauss’ “société-horloge”) to steam locomotive (“société-vapeur”).  
How, as deterritorializations, do the three openings relate to class struggle? 
Culture has been destroyed in so far as there is no big narrative providing the 
conditions of possibility of both independence and interdependence. There is no more 
culture—only some cultivated people. 
4.2.3.2. Fascistic terror or reterritorialization? 
The next stage is likely to be fascistic terror but one cannot rule out the possibility of a 
reterritorialization with a return to an alliance system or the creation of 
compassionate communities. The key is the political apathy that has ruled over the 
last two decades. 
Primo, terror is already the contemporary motto and its enforcement factually 
cancels the class struggle. In order to have class struggles per se you need individuals 
endowed with a sharp class consciousness and organized into unions or similar 
entities. On the one hand, class consciousness relies indeed upon the existence of 
reasonably sized social horizons and especially upon overlapping horizons. On the other 
hand we have to ask how is terror possible? Aristotle knew it already: to allow the rule 
of a tyrant, the City should not be composed of citizens seeking individuation 
(independence, autonomy) and keen to secure solidarity (interdependence, 
heteronomy)—but of conforming and atomized consumers of sorts.33 The description 
of the current state of affairs and the blueprint of what comes next is written down in 
black and while in Nineteen Eighty-Four. Only two technoscientific possibilities seem to 
have escaped Orwell: the forthcoming bio-nano robotics and the extensive use of 
geolocalized RFID chips… 
Secundo, the common praxis would become an alliance if the actors could 
recover their respective sense of duty and reverence. Since the contemporary state of 
affairs is the antechamber of a fascistic implosion of unknown magnitude, the 
reversion to a feudal mentality would undoubtedly constitute an improvement.  
Tertio, only the irruption of the ideal of participatory democracy could really 
obtain a decisive improvement of the life of all the actors. It would involve scaling 
down the social tissue in order to nurture again the compassion that keeps 
communities alive. Sacerdotal citizenship would be back.  
                                                     
33 Aritotle, Politics, 1313a34-b16. 
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4.3. THREE CASES OF POLITICAL BLINDNESS 
Overall, the topological definition of classes presupposes two pluralistic facts: one, 
there are social differences and they are systematically enforced; two, they are largely 
pre-conscious and opaque. 
Primo, social differences are a qualitative matter, not a quantitative one. For 
instance, most people tend to believe nowadays that all individuals consume the exact 
same goods with the exact same enjoyment, the only difference between lower and 
higher wages being the size of their car(s), the amount of garages attached to their 
house(s) or the rate at which they can replenish their fridges: besides sharp differences 
in sex, gender and race, there is no social structure and especially no classes at work. 
We have showed that this is a very superficial understanding that has been first 
noticeable in US-American society. 
Secundo, these systematic differences are not obvious, either experientially or 
rationally, for citizens in their everyday life. Depending on your whereabouts, you 
may, or may not, become conscious of them and your perspective will forever remain 
short-sighted unless you adopt a working hypothesis on the common praxis—but here 
also you can argue only for a limited clarification, both because of the finitude of your 
horizon and its cultural localization (its position in space and time). Let us further 
clarify this issue in light of the contemporary state of affairs. 
4.3.1. Deselection of class membership 
Applied to politics, radical empiricism requires not only that we accept all social 
experiences, but that we look for new experiences at the edges of our customized 
territory. We need to adopt the widest social horizon possible and this in turn leads to 
a broadening of our concern for our fellow human beings and to the enjoyment of a 
corresponding drift towards the far left of the political spectrum. 
The first type of blindness that should be cured is the one touching the opacity of 
the class membership. So far, we have introduced the concept of class from the 
perspective of a personal, positive, experience. Complementarily, one can define class 
by what is negated in or rejected by these experiences. Class membership is then the 
product of a process of selection that could be deactivated. When one reads the 
opacity of class membership as the ground for conformism, it becomes clear that, just 
like in epistemological matters, the selection process needs to be de-activated in order 
to allow for genuine individuation. 
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4.3.2. Lucidity of class consciousness 
The deselection of class membership is not the sole key. The privacy of class 
consciousness, when it succeeds in overcoming the selective process, often leads to 
atomism.  
Social lucidity requires the abandonment of atomic seclusion—at work even in 
class consciousness—to implement solidarity. The subject needs to focus on the 
overlappings between her horizons and other’s and enter in dialogue with her peers. 
4.3.3. Culture 
Nowadays, the all-embracingness of class struggles is doubtful because of the 
disintegration of the social tissue: classes are not easy to identify anymore since each 
individual’s horizon has tremendously shrunk and since the residual horizon conforms 
most of the time to one single pattern: the immediate satisfaction of a blind 
consumer’s will. Even in the rare cases when a choice is rationally made, the 
instrumental rationality at work remains uncritical and the data are valued through 
advertising. The question remains: could culture be a culture of struggle, war and 
colonial predation? Social life should be weaved out of sacerdotal citizenship; it 
cannot result from massified consumerism and warmongerism. We have now entered 
the epoch of total disorientation: there is no self-identity (independence), no 
communal identity (togetherness), and no historical identity (Grand narrative, i.e., 
“paideia” or “Bildung”).  
In sum, the three forms of political blindness are best seen through the lens of the 
three necessary conditions of participative democracy, themselves reflecting the three 
guises of authentic life. The selection of class membership is detrimental to 
individuation; the blind spot of class consciousness needs to be clarified by the 
requirement of solidarity; class struggle loses its impetus as soon as culture is activated. 
Culture is that which seeks to foster both individuation and solidarity. Once the recent 
common praxis (class struggle) and its likely outcome (fascistic terror) are identified, it 
becomes possible to aim at a broadened rationality that transfigures class struggle into 
a compassionate lifestyle. In short: the incipient terror is to be replaced by culture 
and, to repeat, this leads to the inflation of our social horizon and therefore to a far 




I have argued that the more you experience, the more you imagine and the more you 
think, the more you expand your horizon and the more you shift to the left of the 
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political spectrum. So far, Western philosophy has largely commited itself to a 
metaphysics of feudalism,34 it is about time to realize that philosophy qua philosophy is 
intrinsically subversive.  
There can be conservative polititians, right-wing theologians, Nazi intellectuals, 
socialist psychoanalyst or crypto-fascist sociologists—but no conservative 
philosophers, right-wing philosophers, Nazi philosophers or crypto-fascist 
philosophers. As soon as you accept all experiences and seek the ultimate generalities, 
you are ipso facto led to embrace a far left political stance. But do notice that this does 
not imply any extremism whatsoever: it simply means the radical will to see the 
actualization of the three conditions of possibility of authenticity: individuation, 
solidarity and culture. Accordingly, this “far left” does not belong either to historical 
liberalism or to the communist ideal or even to the paideic archetype. It is a place that 
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